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Introduction 
 
Integrating into the European Union is a process of institutional choices and 
subsequent changes in domestic political, economic and legal structures. 
This has indeed been the case for the new member states that joined the EU 
in 2004. Firstly, the Copenhague criteria established by the European 
Council in 1993 set out the obligations on the applicant states.1 The political 
obligations were the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, the respect of human rights and protection of minorities, 
whereas the economic requirements consisted of a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the EU Last, but not least, the applicant states had to manifest 
an ability to incorporate the aquis or “to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of  political, economic and 
monetary union”.2 The process of translating the acquis communitaire into 
the domestic legislation and the building up of political and administrative 
routines for influencing and implementing EU-policies have resulted in an 
unprecedented and far-reaching re-structuration of political, economic and 
administrative institutions and norms.  
 
For eight of the new EU member states of 2004 that either had been 
independent or parts of one-party communist states (Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic and Slovenia) or republics in the Soviet Union 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) EU accession ran in tandem with processes 
of state- and nation building. The rapprochement to the EU and the NATO 
were parallel to the post communist transformation from authoritarian to 
democratic rule and rule of law as well as the development from state-
controlled to market economies. As a matter of fact, the strong commitment 
to membership in the EU was motivated by the belief that full integration 
with the EU would secure progress in the construction of modern liberal 
                                                 
1 Presidency Conclusion, Copenhagen European Council, June 21-22, 1993. 
2 Ibidem, section 7/A. 
  2democracies and market economies. A high prevalence of organisational 
change has consequently characterised these states due to both state and 
nation-building as well as European integration in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Whereas the drawing up of new democratic constitutions in the 1990s 
predominantly has been conceived of as domestically driven processes, the 
integration into the European Union has been portrayed as mainly 
conditioned from outside.3 It has more or less been taken as a given that the 
“EU has, or at least could have, a pervasive influence on the domestic 
policies of the CEES”, but “only a few analysts have made an effort to 
ascertain whether the influence of the EU is so ubiquitous as assumed”.4 
Moreover, the domestic insularity of constitution designing has also been 
questioned since various international organisations exert pressure on how 
states formulate the basic rules of the political game.5  This study is situated 
within this broader academic debate since it aims at analysing how external 
and internal factors interact in how national parliaments adapt to European 
integration.  
 
The design of parliamentary oversight structures 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the design of parliamentary EU oversight 
structures in the eight CEE (Central and East European) states that joined 
the EU in 2004. The purpose is to investigate the impact of policy transfer in 
the development of parliamentary EU oversight scrutiny procedures. The 
empirical puzzle guiding the article is why seven out of the eight CEE states 
opted for a mandate-based scrutiny of EU Affairs in which the government 
needs to seek an explicit mandate from the parliament when negotiating in 
the EU?  The mandate-based parliamentary scrutiny was until 2004 
predominantly a Northern parliamentary experience. It had spread from the 
Markedsutvalget  of the Danish parliament to the newcomers in 1995: 
Sweden, Finland and Austria. This so-called “Nordic model” of parliamentary 
scrutiny of EU Affairs was attractive to emulate in the new EU member 
                                                 
3 Kopecky Petr & Mudde, Cas, 2000, “What has Eastern Europe Taught Us About the Democratisation 
Literature (and vice versa), European Journal of Political Research 37:517-539., Vachudova, 2004, etceteras?  
4 Schimmelfennig, Frank & Sedelmeier, Frank 2005,  p.3. 
5 See for instance Linz and Stepan 1996, Grigorescu, Alexandra, 2002, “Transferring Transparency: The Impact 
of European Institutions on East and Central Europe in Linden, R(ed), p.68-75.   
  3states of 2004 and is at present the most common model for parliamentary 
control of the EU policy-making. The parliaments were in their designs of 
parliamentary oversight organisations to different degrees inspired by the 
mandating model. Moreover, the mandating parliamentary scrutiny is 
differently organised in terms of the scope of the scrutiny in Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland and Austria. Firstly, the scope of the mandating varied in 
terms of which EU acts need an explicit mandate from the EU (and other 
relevant) committees and the regularity of the mandating.  Moreover, the 
Danish and Austrian Committees on EU Affairs can legally bind the 
concerned minister to a position, whereas the mandates in Finland and 
Sweden are politically binding.  The aim of this paper is to cast some light on 
why the mandating model turned out to be so attractive and to map down 
which countries served as inspirations and why/how?  
 
Why study policy transfer?   
Policy transfer is an umbrella concept for theories that account for how and 
why policies travel from one place to another. Policy transfer has been 
defined as a “process by which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) 
is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in another political system”.6 Lesson-drawing is a 
closely related concept conveying processes when policy-makers in one place 
import ideas or policies developed elsewhere.7 Emulation is the utilisation of 
evidence about a programme or programmes overseas.8 What, then, 
motivates a focus on policy transfer in how the member states designed their 
parliamentary EU-organisations? The fact that one particular model for 
parliamentary oversight was particularly popular to emulate among the new 
member states suggests that learning from others’ experiences partly could 
explain the striking similarity in the design of national parliamentary EU 
                                                 
6 Dolowitz, David P. & Marsh, David, 2000,“Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in 
Contemporary Policy-Making in Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, vol.13, no 
1, January 2000.  
7 Rose, Richard, 1993, Lesson Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space, Chatham. 
N:J.: Chatham House. 
8 Bennett, 1991, p.221 
  4oversight organisation. There is obviously a possibility that convergence is 
the result of that the national parliaments elaborated their EU-oversight 
mechanisms independently of one another and approached them in similar 
ways without there being policy transfer.9 It has been observed that public 
problem solving generally is an imitative art where structures and policies 
from other places are borrowed and adapted.10  
 
However, the likelihood for inspiration and learning from abroad is likely to 
be high in this case since the design of the national parliamentary EU 
organizations is related to international obligations with intense 
transnational networks. Moreover, the process of designing parliamentary 
EU control instruments (in the newcomer states) occurred during a period 
when the issue of national parliaments was high on the EU political agenda. 
In the Laeken declaration attached to the Treaty of Nice the role of national 
parliaments in the EU policy making was one of the four prioritised issues 
that should be taken into consideration in the preparation of the 
Constitutional Treaty for the EU.11 Different methods for involving national 
parliaments were addressed within the European Convention preparing the 
EU draft treaty and the COSAC both in which representatives from the 
candidate countries took part. There were also various transnational and 
bilateral contacts between existing and becoming EU-members at which the 
parliamentary organisation of EU policy-making was debated.  All in all, the 
status of existing research as well as the particular setting invites for a study 
where emphasis is given to policy diffusion (and how learning from the 
accession period (over time) and other examples (over space) impacted upon 
the choice of parliamentary EU scrutiny model.) 
 
                                                 
9 Hoberg, George, 2001, ”Globalization and Policy Convergence: Symposium Overview, Journal of 
Comparative Politicy Analysis: Research and Practice, nr 3 p. 127, Holzinger  Katharina & Knill, Christopher 
2005, “Causes and Conditions of crossnational  policy convergence” in Journal of European Public Policy, vol 
12, nr, p. 780 suggest that “parallel domestic pressures” or “independent problem solving” as reasons for 
convergence.  
10 Bennett, Colin J, 1991, “What Is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?” in British Journal of Political 
Science, vol.21, no 2, p. 220.  
11 Referens!  
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older member states) have almost exclusively focussed endogenous or 
domestic factors, whereas the impact of exogenous factors has been 
downplayed.12 That is, diffusion and learning from parliamentary 
arrangements in other member states have not been systematically analysed 
even though it occasionally has been suggested that for instance Finland 
and Sweden took inspiration from Denmark (and UK as well in the Finnish 
case) when designing their parliamentary organisations of EU affairs.13 
Ultimately, domestic and international factors are likely to be 
complementary, but this paper is dedicated to the study of the role of 
external impulses in the design of the parliamentary EU-organisations in the 
ten EU newcomer states from 2004.  
  
Models of parliamentary EU oversight  
All national parliaments in the EU member states have some structures for 
parliamentary involvement in the EU policy making. Well in advance before 
the day of EU-membership the parliaments in the then ten candidate states 
of 2004 initiated a process of formulating their parliamentary oversight 
institutions. The national parliaments were during the accession period 
involved in the process of adjusting legislation to EU requirements, i.e., 
fulfilling the so-called Copenhague criteria as well as harmonising domestic 
legislation to the European body of law, i.e., the acquis communitaire. For 
this purpose specific EU committees were set up in the candidate states’ 
parliaments, as a rule on ad hoc basis.14 During this period the national 
parliaments translated and implemented EU-rules since this type of policy-
                                                 
12 Bergman, Torbjörn, 2000, “The European Union and EU Affairs Committees: Notes on empirical variation 
and competing explanations” Journal of Political Research 37(3):415-429,  Raunio Tapio, 2005, “Holding 
Governments Accountable in European Affairs: Explaining Cross-National Variation” in The Journal of 
Legislative Studies, vol.11, n.3/4, pp.319-342. Domestic factors such as public EU opinion, overall parliamentary 
power, frequency of minority governments, party positions on integration and the proportion of 
orthodox/catholic respectively protestants as aproxy for political culture in the population)  are used in 
explaining the variation in parliamentary oversight procedures of the EU-policy making. According to Raunio 
there is correlation between strong EU scrutiny and general  parliamentary power and a EU-sceptic opinion.  
13 See for instance Raunio, 2005, Hegeland, Hans, 1999, Riksdagen, Europeiska unionen och demokratin. En 
studie av riksdagens arbete med EU-frågor, Lund, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen.  
14 Lithuania formed a standing committee on European Affairs in 1995 and the upper houses of the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia formed standing committees for European integration issues in 1998 and 1993, 
respectively.   
  6taking was a condition for membership. However, as full EU members the 
national parliaments also would take part in the policy making in that they 
would participate in the formulation of common EU-rules. Since the 
governments represent the member states in the EU policy- making and 
thereby exercise legislative powers that formally belong to the national 
assembly, the parliaments need to create mechanisms in order to be able to 
influence and control the policies their governments support in the EU. The 
organization of the parliamentary involvement is consequently crucial since 
it concerns the distribution of power and ultimately one channel for popular 
control of the EU policy-making. The EU does not only suffer from a 
“democratic deficit” by itself, but can also contribute to democratic deficits 
within the member states.  
 
Information and participation 
There are no self-evident classifications to describe the various organisations 
the parliaments have developed to control their governments in EU Affairs.  
Descriptions and evaluations of the parliamentary EU oversight instruments 
do depart from the means for information on the one hand and the 
instruments for influence and participation on the other. Access to EU and 
other relevant information and institutionalised contacts with other actors, 
such as ministries, civil society, Members of the European parliament and 
other national parliaments belong to the first group. The deliberations 
between the parliament and the government and the scope of parliamentary 
involvement are crucial for the possibilities for the parliamentary 
participation and in the end the scope of influence.  
 
These factors constitute power resources national parliaments have at their 
disposal to influence and control the EU policy-making. Access to 
information on EU-proposals and knowledge about ongoing EU discussions 
are prerequisites for efficient participation. The type of information, the 
responsibility of distribution and selection of information are crucial in this 
respect. (Is there too much or too little information, does the government or 
the parliament itself produce explicative memoranda, which explain the 
  7central items of a proposal and its relevance/effects for domestic politics). 
Contacts with external actors, such as members of the European parliament 
or other national parliaments or direct contacts with domestic or EU civil 
servants are valuable for getting information from other sources than the 
own government.  
 
The character of the deliberations with the government can however be 
characterised as the most important asset. Information is a crucial resource, 
but of little use if the possibilities to have say in the actual policy-making are 
weak. The regularity of the deliberations and the capability of the parliament 
to explicitly mandate and tie the hand of the government in the EU-
negotiations have been identified as crucial parameters. The scope of the 
parliamentary involvement is dependent on whether the EU-policy making is 
a task for a restricted group of parliamentarians or if a wider spectra of 
parliamentarians within their particular specialisations (standing 
committees) deal with EU matters. That is, is the preparation of EU affairs 
centralised to the specific committee of EU Affairs or are the standing 
committees involved in the screening as well?  The involvement of the 
standing committees invites on the one hand for broader participation and 
the use of parliamentary expertise in the deliberations with the government, 
whereas they on the other hand can hamper the coordination in the 
negotiations.  
  
Denmark and UK as models  
The role of the national parliaments in the EU policy making has attracted 
greater attention along with the gradual deepening (vertical integration) of 
EU and the intensification of the debate on the democratic deficit of the EU. 
When UK and Denmark joined the EU in 1973 these two parliaments had 
developed two different, but distinct models for the parliamentary scrutiny of 
EU-Affairs. These parliaments were not the first to develop special 
mechanisms for the parliamentary control of the policy making in the EU, 
but they initiated a trend whereby the national parliaments as a rule had 
created EU oversight mechanisms from the day of accession (and also 
  8parliamentary structures for monitoring the accession negotiations). In fact, 
the German Bundesrat was the first parliament to create a “Committee on 
the Common Market and the Free Trade Area” in 1957 in order to ensure 
that the Länder had a say in the federal government’s policy making. The 
Belgian Chamber of Deputies and the Italian Senate formed European Affairs 
Committees in 1962 and 1968 respectively.    
 
The prevalence of popular and party-political EU-scepticism in both the UK 
and Denmark was probably a major factor why the two parliaments designed 
structures for the parliamentary oversight of EU policies. In UK where the 
electoral system produces majority governments a document-based model in 
which the parliament follows the EU policy making by screening documents 
was designed. The logic behind the Danish parliamentary scrutiny is to 
secure that the government has the backing of a parliamentary majority (or 
rather is not opposed by a parliamentary majority) when negotiating in the 
Council of Ministers. Since minority governments were frequent in Denmark 
during his period (and which has been the case also afterwards) it was 
considered important that the parliament could tie the hands of the 
ministers. From a formal point of view the parliamentary mandate to the 
responsible minister is politically binding, but a practice of formally binding 
mandate has developed. The responsible minister cannot in Council 
negotiations deviate from the parliamentary opinion, unless reconsultation 
takes place.  
 
The British and the Danish cases are the empirical cases for two ideal-typic 
descriptive models for parliamentary EU oversight, namely, the document-
based scrutiny on the one hand and the mandate-based scrutiny on the 
other. The parliamentary activity in the document-based scrutiny is focussed 
on screening and examining legislative proposals and other documents 
emanating from the EU. The parliament sifts all types of EU documents in 
order to find the most important ones and when considered necessary the 
parliament can consult the responsible minister in order to get more 
information and ultimately present the parliamentary view. However, within 
  9the document-based the parliaments have no formal instruments at their 
disposal to issue the government binding instructions in the EU 
negotiations. The parliaments have a limited time period to deal with a EU-
proposal and the government are expected not to finalise the negotiation 
before the parliament has completed its scrutiny. However, it is up to the 
parliament to signal if and when it wants to intervene in the process of 
formulating the EU negotiation position.  
 
Even though the government in a parliamentary political system needs to 
retain the confidence of the parliament and therefore would be inclined to 
take the parliamentary majority into account, the mandating model is 
considered to invite for better parliamentary control of the EU policy making 
since the parliamentary scrutiny concentrates on formulating an opinion on 
the governmental EU negotiation positions.15 Therefore the government is 
obliged to present its negotiation position before the parliament (as a rule the 
Committee of European affairs) in order to make sure that there is an 
explicit parliamentary majority in support for the government’s negotiation 
position. This practice invites for parliamentary engagement in the EU policy 
making since they are expected to make up an opinion on the governmental 
EU- position, which the government is expected to follow. The parliamentary 
mandate is as a rule politically binding and in case a minister deviates from 
the agreed negotiation position he/she has to explain himself to the 
Committee. The mandating is as a rule applied on matters of greater 
importance (EU legislative proposals, European Council meetings, etceteras). 
The national parliaments use different criteria in order to select which EU 
proposals require an explicit mandate.  
 
The scope of parliamentary involvement in the EU policy making has lately 
attracted more attention. Is the parliamentary involvement in the EU policy 
making restricted to the specialised European Affairs Committees or are the 
standing committee involved as well?  In the mandating models the EAC 
                                                 
15 See Raunio, 2005 and Maurer, Andreas & Wessels, Wolfgang, 2001, National Parliaments on their Ways to 
Europe: Losers of Latecomers?, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 461-463. 
  10deliberates with and mandates the government on EU policies on in various 
fields. That is, even though the Committee has a general expertise they 
negotiate on legislative proposals from different policy areas, which otherwise 
would be a matter for the specialised standing committees. Some EAC have 
requirements that all specialised standing committees should be represented 
in the EAC, whereas it is more common with proportional representations of 
the parliamentary party groups. Some parliaments has made it obligatory for 
standing committees to participate in the mandating process by scrutinising 
the governmental positions (Finland), whereas others encourage standing 
committees to take part (Sweden, Denmark, Latvia). In the document based 
scrutiny the standing committees participate as a rule in the screening EU 
policies, whereas the European Affairs Committees have a stronger position 
in the mandating since they deliberate with the government. That is, the 
mandating model is a more centralised parliamentary oversight organisation 
with a group of parliamentarians specialised in EU policies  (but perhaps 
more powerful), whereas the document based scrutiny to a greater extent 
involves the entire parliament in the EU policy-making.  
 
The diffusion of parliamentary oversight organisations 
 
It is not uncommon that diffusion exhibits a distinct pattern, for instance 
policies tend to spread in wave-like patterns.16 A policy or an institution is 
considered attractive and transferred to other environments. The spread of 
the mandating model for parliamentary EU scrutiny exhibits some traits that 
are common to policy diffusion. Firstly, diffusion tends to occur in distinct 
temporal waves so that the cumulative frequency takes the form of a curve. 
From the illustration below we can see that over time and the later a state 
has joined the EU) the higher the propensity that the parliamentary EU 
scrutiny is mandate based.  (Some states are omitted in the table!, but this 
does not change the general picture). It has been suggested that national 
parliaments “would react to the deepening integration” or a more powerful 
                                                 
16 Weyland, Kurt, 2005, Theories of policy diffusion  Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform, World 
Politics 57, January 2005 p. 262- 95 
  11EU by tighter EU scrutiny.17 This is a functional explanation based on 
rational action since the choice of institution is related to the development of 
the EU system. In this case policy convergence would be to expect: The 
temporal distribution of the parliamentary scrutiny models in terms of that 
the stronger mandating model has been more popular among the more 
recent EU members could be an indicator of that the scope of the integration 
at the time of membership matters. The microfoundations or causal 
mechanisms, which would be needed to support the explanation is then that 
considerations on the power of the EU is taken into consideration in the 
design of the parliamentary scrutiny.   
 
Table 1  Diffusion of parliamentary scrutiny models fr0m 1952-
2004 in EU 25 (Bulgaria and Romania are not included).  
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In addition to the temporal dimension diffusion can also exhibit a distinct 
geographical pattern as policies tend first to spread in the region “in which 
the innovation was designed and only later reaching other areas of the 
                                                 
17 Raunio, 2005, p.326. 
  12world”.18 This pattern also applies to the spread of the mandating 
parliamentary scrutiny model since it was designed or developed in Denmark 
and then spread to Sweden, Finland and Austria. The mandating model has 
been implemented by the four new member states in the close Baltic Sea 
Area, i.e., Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, but also to member states 
further away from the northern EU member states: Slovenia, Hungary and 
Slovakia. One possibility is that the geographical concentration of the 
mandating model in the Northern EU member states is consequence of that 
proximity invites for imitation due to contacts among neighbours in the 
Baltic Sea Area. Another explanation is that the proximity actually is a proxy 
for cultural, political and social similarities. The pattern of diffusion can only 
transmit a picture of how policies spread, but cannot account for why 
certain policies spread more than others. That is, agency needs to be taken 
into consideration. 
  
The distribution of parliamentary EU scrutiny models 
The British and Danish parliamentary models have been attractive templates 
to emulate. The older member states such as France and Italy reorganised 
the parliamentary scrutiny in the 1990s inspired by the British model and 
the new member states of 1995, such as Finland and Sweden were inspired 
by the Danish case when designing their parliamentary EU oversight. As a 
matter of fact Finland combined the British and the Danish models so that 
the standing committees were involved in the screening and the EU 
Committee (the Grand Committee in Finland) formulates a binding mandate 
for the government.     
 
There is a distinct geographical pattern of the two parliamentary scrutiny 
models: The document-based scrutiny dominates in the older member 
states, except for the UK in France, Italy and Ireland. Among the newcomers 
from 2004 only Malta, Cyprus and the Czech Republic opted for the 
document-based model. The mandate-based scrutiny was until the latest 
enlargement geographically concentrated to the North of the EU (Denmark, 
                                                 
18 Weyland, 2005, p.236.  
  13Sweden and Finland) and Austria Seven out of the ten newcomer national 
parliaments chose to set up a model of mandate-based parliamentary 
scrutiny; Estonia, Latvia. Lithuania, Slovenia, Poland, Slovakia and 
Hungary. The mandate-based model is consequently today the most frequent 
model for parliamentary scrutiny in the EU.  
 
Some of the parliamentary EU scrutiny organisations can neither be 
characterised as document nor mandate-based. The role of the parliaments 
in the making of EU policies is as a rule weaker in these cases and their 
function is to initiate and carry out general discussions on EU, inform the 
public and etceteras! Spain, Portugal, Greece and a number of other 
parliaments belong to this quite heterogenous group.   
  
Table 2: Types of parliamentary scrutiny in EU 25 
Sources: Parliamentary websites, COSAC. 
Types of parliamentary oversight in EU memberstates 
Scrutiny of 
documents 
Mandating Other 
United Kingdom  Denmark  Spain 
Ireland (Oireachts)  Austria  Portugal 
France Finland  Greece 
Czech Republic  Sweden  Belgium 
Netherlands* (JHA)  Estonia  Luxembourg 
Italy Latvia   
Malta Lithuania   
Germany Slovakia   
Cyprus  Slovenia  
 Poland   
 Hungary   
 
 
Inspiration from where? 
There are different degrees of policy transfer. To a certain extent one can say 
that policy transfer occurs in all types of policy making since experiences 
from other places often are considered. The interesting aspect is the scope or 
degree of the transfer: Are existing models copied and completely transferred  
or are the main ideas behind a policy emulated as a new organisations 
  14structure?19 Or are existing policies utilised as means for inspiration? The 
idea of a strong parliament empowered to mandate the government attractive 
to emulate. But these ideas were in different ways transferred and 
integrated. That is, there are examples of both copying and innovations of 
existing mandating organisations, i.e., the Finnish, Swedish and Danish, but 
also the Austrian parliamentary arrangements were attractive. In the table 
below, which is based on written reports as well as interviews the patterns of 
inspiration are indicated. 
 
The mandating models were designed differently in the new member states. 
Estonia, Latvia. Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia (National Assembly) have 
like their northern neighbours institutionalised regular mandating routines 
in which the European Affairs Committees on a regular basis deliberate and 
mandate the government on EU draft legislation, but also on other matters 
considered politically relevant. The EACs in the parliaments in Poland (the 
Sejm) and Hungary also mandate, but less frequently.  
 
Estonia and Slovenia have also been inspired by the Finnish parliamentary 
scrutiny since it is obligatory for the standing committees to formulate the 
draft positions on which the EAC committees deliberate with the 
government. The Lithuanian parliament has made it obligatory for the 
standing committees to participate in the screening of important issues that 
need to be mandated (except for EU legislative proposals) by the EAC, but 
they are not as regularly involved in formulation of the parliamentary 
opinions as the standing committees in Estonia and Slovenia.   
 
                                                 
19 Rose 1993, Dolowitz, David and Marsh, 2000, p. 8, 13. 
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Table 3. EU oversight organisation, the area/country of main 
inspiration and transferred characteristics in the ten member 
states that joined the EU in 2004.  
 
1)State 2)EU  oversight 
model 
3)Main 
inspiration 
4)Transferred 
Characteristics 
from 3) 
ESTONIA 
Regulation: 
15.3.2004 
Riigikogu Rules of 
Procedure Act 
Mandating 
(politically binding)  
 
Finland/Nordic  1)Committee of EU 
Affairs/ Committee 
of Foreign Affairs 
responsible for 
regular mandating 
2)Compulsory for 
standing 
Committees  to 
formulate draft 
opinions for EAC 
LATVIA 
1995 
Constitution 
Rules of Procedure 
of the Sejm 
(amended 2001) 
Mandating 
(politically binding) 
Sweden /Nordic  1)Regular mandating 
before Council 
meeting 
2)Standing 
committees 
encouraged to get 
involved, but debate 
on better 
institutionalisation  
LITHUANIA 
Est.18.9.1997 
Revised 9.11.2004 
Statute of the Sejm 
Mandating 
(politically bidning) 
Finland/Nordic 1)Involvement  of 
EAC and of standing 
committees (only in 
screening important 
issues that must be 
mandated by the 
EAC) 
3)Innovation: 
Semafor 
organization for  
SLOVENIA 
National Assembly 
April 2004 
Article 3A of the 
Constitutional Act and 
article 2A of the Rules 
of procedures of the 
National Assembly 
National Council 
1993 
Article 97 of the 
Constitution of the 
Republic of Slovenia. 
 
Mandating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Screening 
The International and 
European Affairs 
Committee may 
formulate opinion (non-
binding) 
Finland/Nordic  1)Committee of EU 
Affairs/ Committee 
of Foreign Affairs 
responsible for 
regular mandating 
2)Involvement of 
standing committees 
SLOVAKIA 
29.4.2004 
The Constitutional ACt 
No. 397/2004 
Mandating 
-The Committee on 
European Affairs approves 
the positions of the 
government concerning 
Nordic (Swe/Den)  1)The EAC  positions are 
binding for the 
government 
2)Standing 
Committees can be 
  16proposals for EU legislation. 
 
asked to formulate 
position on 
government 
proposal. 
HUNGARY 
Article 35/A. of the 
Hungarian Constitution, 
the Act LIII. of 2004 on 
the cooperation of the 
Parliament and the 
Government in 
European Union affairs 
and the Standing Orders 
of the National 
Assembly: Articles 
134/A-D. 
 
Mandating 
-  The European Affairs 
Committee examines draft 
proposal to be adopted by 
the Council 
Nordic/Austrian 1)Standing 
committees can send 
their opinions 
2)The mandating 
arrangements less 
regular than in the 
Nordic parliaments.  
POLAND 
The Sejm 
28.7.2005 
Standing Orders of 
the Sejm 
(the current 
committee 
established 14 May 
2004 
The Senate 
Act on Cooperation 
Between Council of 
Ministers with the 
Sejm in Matters 
Related to 
 
 
Mandating?/screening? 
(not unconditional 
mandate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Screening 
 
Nordic? and /or 
Austrian? 
 
1)Regular mandating 
on EU legislation of 
the EAC   
 
 
Czech Republic 
Chamber of 
Deputies 
May 2004 
Czech Constitution 
article 10b and ACT of 
7th May 2004,amending 
Act No. 90/1995 Coll., 
on the Rules of 
Procedure of the 
Chamber of Deputies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senate 
1998 
Czech Constitution (Art. 
10b) and section 119 of 
the rules of procedure of 
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  The Czech Republic, Malta and Cyprus opted for a document based 
screening procedures, inspired by the UK House of Commons parliamentary 
procedures. In the Maltese case the inspirations from UK is openly stated in 
annual report of the European Affairs Committee from 2004: “The scrutiny 
procedure by the Maltese Parliament is closely modelled on the UK Scrutiny 
System”.20   
 
To conclude, seven out of the ten new member states of 2004 chose some 
type of mandate-based parliamentary scrutiny. The remainder of the paper is 
dedicated to a discussion of how different theoretical perspectives can 
provide some clues for the popularity of the mandating model. Naturally, the 
“deviating” cases (the states that opted for the document-based scrutiny 
need to be accounted for as well in future research.)     
 
Theoretical perspectives 
There are some theoretical perspectives that account for why similar choices 
are made in different places. Some concentrate on conditional external 
pressure and other focus other types of external impulses emanating from 
trans-national communication. These take into consideration international 
organisations or states as relevant actors and arenas for the disseminations 
of information and experiences, whereas a third group of theories provide 
instruments for explaining the actual choices actors made. These theories 
cannot be conceived of as mutually exclusive, but can rather complement 
one another.  
External conditionality  
External pressure is a frequent explanation for policy convergence around 
the world.21 International organisations such as for instance the EU, WTO 
and the IMF push for certain policies and by using the carrot (EU-
                                                 
20 The Standing Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, House of Representatives, Malta,  Annual Report 
2004, p.11. The choice of a document based screening seems to have been quite evident since the institutional 
visits are almost exclusively directed to the UK.   
21 Melo, 2004, “Institutional Choice and the Diffusion of Policy Paradigms: Brazil and the Second Wave of 
Pension Reform” in International Political Science Review, vol.25, nr.3, p.320-341, Weyland, 2005, 
  18membership, international loans, etceteras) or the stick (sanctions) impose 
certain policies and institutions upon states. This type of external pressures 
is a potential explanation when similar policies are selected in a wide range 
of countries. Such direct imposition or coercive transfer may result in 
convergence since an organisation, as a rule a supranational body or a 
state/groups of states by various means can enforce compliance.22 An 
asymmetrical power relationship is a prerequisite for why an organisation is 
in position to dictate the rules of the game Domestic actors have a minimum 
of choice in these processes. International harmonisation is another category 
of external pressure emanating from a state’s compliance according to 
existing international obligations, as for instance membership in the EU23. 
EU member states are obliged to follow binding EU rules, which they have 
taken part in formulating. This particular type of external imposition has 
been defined negotiated transfer since the states in theory can have some 
influence on the rules.24 Depending on the character of the rules 
international harmonisation may lead to convergence in policy outputs, 
outcomes and/or instruments. Neither external imposition nor conditional 
international harmonisation can account for the popularity of the mandating 
model for parliamentary scrutiny of EU Affairs in the new member states as 
the EU has no mandate to formulate binding norms for how national 
parliaments should organise their EU-work.  
 
Soft EU rules and meditative activities 
However, EU guidelines and recommendations have been formulated on the 
role of national parliaments in the EU policy-making. These soft non-binding 
rules have always been accompanied with precautionary statements like 
“scrutiny by individual national parliaments of their own government in 
relation to the activities of the Union is a matter for the particular 
constitutional organization and practice of each Member State”.25 As a 
matter of fact, it is a sensitive issue since it is up to each and every member 
                                                 
22 Dolowitz and Marsh, p. 9-11, Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p.781, Ikenberry, 1990.    
23 Bennett, 1991, p. 225, Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p.778. 
24 Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p.15 
25 Protocol on the role of the national parliaments in the European Union (Treaty of Amsterdam). 
  19state to choose its proper parliamentary organisation of EU affairs. That is, 
the EU cannot oblige any member state to set up any or some particular 
parliamentary oversight structures. Nevertheless, non-binding guidelines 
have been formulated within the EU stressing the importance of involving 
the national parliaments in the EU-policy-making. These recommendations 
have been intimately related to the debate on the “democratic deficit” of the 
EU, which gained momentum in the 1990s.  A first declaration was added to 
the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) from 1993 where the participation of 
national parliaments was encouraged by underlining the responsibility of 
national governments to forward information on EU legislative proposals to 
their parliaments. The importance of engaging the parliaments was once 
again taken up in the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam 1997. The recommendations were then more specific 
compared to the ones from1993. Firstly, the types of documents that must 
be forwarded to the member states (read governments) and the permissible 
time-period for translating Council decisions were laid down. These 
responsibilities were within the EU institutions. Secondly, the Conference of 
European Affairs Committees COSAC was mentioned as an important 
meeting-point for parliamentarians from national parliaments, but also for 
members of the European parliament. COSAC has no formal competence, 
but is an arena for discussion and exchange of opinions between 
parliamentarians.26COSAC was created in 1989 and is a “co-operation 
between committees  of  the  national parliaments dealing with European 
affairs as well as representatives from the European Parliament”. General 
meetings are held biannually (usually hosted by the Presidency of the EU). 
These sessions have thematic programmes where specific issues related to 
the role of national parliaments in the EU are addressed. COSAC has since 
2004 published biannual reports on various themes, such as the scrutiny 
procedures in the member states, the preparation for the subsidiarity control 
of national parliaments in the draft Treaty, etceteras.27 The information in 
                                                 
26 http://www.cosac.eu/en/cosac/) 
27 http://www.cosac.eu/en/documents/biannual/) 
 
  20these reports is usually provided by the national parliaments themselves, 
but give a possibility to compare practices and experiences in the member 
states. The COSAC also invites academics to present research on national 
parliaments and the EU to their sessions.       
 
Within the framework of the COSAC a set of Copenhagen parliamentary 
guidelines were formulated in 2003.  28  They were formulated together by 
national parliamentarians from old and to-be member states. The initiative 
came from the working group on national parliaments in the European 
Convention preparing the Draft Treaty for the European “constitution”.   
These criteria were presented as instructive principles or a kind of 
“instructive minimum standards…it is up to each Parliament to decide the 
extent to which the guidelines should be implemented”. Three elements in 
the parliamentary scrutiny were highlighted 1) the quantity and quality of 
information, 2) the timing of information exchange and 3) the opportunities 
the national parliaments have to use the information to have some influence 
on Community Policy. However, no particular model was mentioned as a 
model or best practice to follow in the official documentation, but there were 
pressures from the EU or EU affiliated on the new member states to set up 
parliamentary EU oversight procedures. However, the EU as such could not 
impose nor did the EU formulate any guidelines in favour of any particular 
model (in terms of mandating, document-screening or the scope of 
committee involvement, for instance) as there is no common European 
template for parliamentary participation in the EU policy- making.  
 
The soft guidelines can be characterised as instruments in the inquisitive 
activities directed towards member states of the EU, as for instance by the 
COSAC.29 Even though member states in a formal sense are not forced to 
take these ideas in consideration, they are involved in networks and 
environments where they are requested to present their policies, which are 
                                                 
28 European Parliament, ‘Copenhagen parliamentary guidelines’ Guidelines for relations between governments 
and Parliaments on Community Issues (instructive minimum standards, COSAC, 27.1.2003, (Official Journal of 
the European Union C 154/1).  
29 Jacobson, Bengt, 2007, Scripted States, unpublished manuscript.  
  21compared and judged. Since the member states of the EU jointly have 
produced soft rules on what should be taken into consideration for how 
national parliaments organise their EU-organisations these constitute 
staring points or unofficial criteria for the debates and comparisons between 
them. Good practices and well performing cases of parliamentary EU 
scrutiny may be identified and formulated through these activities.      
 
The activities within the EU institutions or affiliated bodies are consequently 
arenas for the exchange and comparison of practices and experiences 
between representatives from the member states. The same goes for the large 
amount of other seminars and conferences that were held upon the themes 
of EU, democracy and national parliaments and the multitude of contacts 
between the European national parliaments (both between parliamentarians 
and civil servants). Added to this are the various bilateral and multilateral 
contacts between the national parliaments. That is, the design of 
parliamentary scrutiny organisations took place in an environment of 
multiple arenas for meditative activities where experiences were shared, 
compared and evaluated and where stories of good examples and bad 
performers were told. It has been claimed that policy transfer processes 
“require activities where “best practices” are produced. All those that want to 
be seen as innovators need to have a supply of good stories and reform 
proposals to be able to choose from as they bring together and promulgate 
their own innovations”.30 To conclude, these arenas had a vital role, as 
exemplified by a viewpoint from  “Exchanging best practices, views on 
common points of interests, and problems during COSAC as well as personal 
contacts established there have contributed to the development of the 
Estonian parliamentary system”.31  
 
The question is which best practices and good performers were identified 
and formulated in these transnational discussions? Firstly, research results 
                                                 
30 Ibidem, p.4. 
31 European Union Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu, General Overview, www.riigikogu.eu) 
 
  22were disseminated and researchers on national parliaments were invited to 
write reports of talk on parliamentary democracy and the EU. The research 
in the field is quite straightforward in identifying the mandating models as 
the stronger ones. The major part of the academic research has attempted to 
assess which parliaments are the most active and or successful in 
influencing EU Affairs. They use a number of indicators, such as access to 
information, involvement of specialised committees and the character, scope 
and timing of the parliamentary involvement.32  
 
Secondly, the old member-states presented and advertised their models of 
parliamentary scrutiny.  In particular, the three parliaments in the Nordic 
EU member-states marketed the mandating model by publishing a pamphlet 
on “European Affairs Committees in Finland, Sweden and Denmark in 2002. 
That is, there was active marketing from the three main mandating states, in 
particular during the European Convention. The parliamentary EU scrutiny 
was presented as a quite coherent “Nordic model” even though there are 
differences between them: ”It makes sense to talk of a Nordic model of 
European Affairs Committees, as the basic principle that Parliaments 
exercises influence and supervision over their Governments on EU questions 
is the same”.33 The initiative for this brochure came from Denmark (and was 
written by civil servants of the Danish Folketing). According to one of the 
representatives from the Swedish parliament in the European Convention 
(and the then chairman of the Swedish EU Committee) this offensive by the 
Northern parliaments was not met positively by parliamentarians from other 
member states.   
 
                                                 
32 To mention a few examples Maurer & Wessels, 2001, p. 463, Raunio & Wiberg, 2000, p. 351-351, Raunio, 
2005, p.321-322).  (All these researchers have taken part in conferences organised by the COSAC). In the 
Maurer & Wessels analysis of the strength of parliamentary scrutiny the member states with mandating 
arrangement are situated in the top, i.e., Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria – whereas the document based come 
thereafter and the member states with other arrangements are at the bottom. (Luxemburg, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece).   
33 In the working group of national parliaments at the European Convention the parliamentary EU oversight 
procedures in the member states were presented. According  to Sören Lekberg, the Swedish parliamentary 
representative in the working group the mandating models of DK, SWE and FIN were presented as a Nordic 
model. This term was also used in the domestic parliamentary debate in Sweden. The Nordic parliaments had a 
joint publication (October 2002) where the Nordic parliamentary EU-organisations were presented “The EU and 
democracy in the Nordic region European Affaris Committees in Finland, Sweden and Denmark”.   
  23Thirdly, some type of “silent” knowledge of best practices was disseminated 
and promulgated. That is, there was some agreed-upon conception of good 
practices in the parliamentary networks. For instance, A Lithuanian civil 
servant told that when a group of EAC members and civil servants visited 
the House of Commons they learnt that the Finnish model was the most 
efficient “Everyone told us that the Finnish model of parliamentary scrutiny 
of EU-Affairs” was the most efficient one, even when we were not in Finland”.  
 
In particular the civil servants have intense contacts and often know one 
another by name. They could perhaps be characterised as a type of advocacy 
coalition that have promoted certain models for organising the parliamentary 
EU Affairs in the new member states. In the Estonian internal parliamentary 
publication Riigikogu Toimetised  (nr 7/2003) the chief civil servant of the 
EAC states that “The examples of Finland, Sweden and Denmark are worth 
following. The much advertised Danish system has been based on the 
tradition of minority governments where the cabinet must basically 
reconfirm its mandate for each step. In the Swedish system, the main 
problem is that the Riksdag is not in a strong position of having an effect on 
the political will of the majority cabinet. The Finnish model is based ona 
semi-presidential system, and it is very important that the members of 
Eduskunta formulates opinions that have effect on the EU decisions”.34 The 
impact of civil servants in this process varied depending on their role in the 
preparations of the EAC committees. Usually a parliamentary committee was 
set up to investigate the possible reforms to be made in the national 
parliaments as full members of the EU, whereas in the Slovenian case a 
group a civil servants and experts formulated a proposal for the 
parliamentary EU scrutiny. According to one of the civil servants this 
procedure partly explained why the Finnish model was emulated in the 
National Assembly of the two-chamber Slovenian parliament (interview).    
                                                 
34 Olev Aarma, 2003, ”Rahvusparlamendi valikud Euroopa Liidus” in Riigikogu Tomised 7/2003. In addition the 
auhor describes the result from a research report where the Finnish parliamentarians state that have more of a say 
in the EU-policy making that their Swedish collegues,  (by Jungar & Öberg .Ahlbäck (2002) Parlament I 
bakvatten”  
  24  However, the Nordic attraction was prevalent among the political 
representatives as well. According to the Estonian parliamentarian Marko 
Mihkelson, chairman of the EAC and representing the political party Res 
Publica “Estonia does not necessarily have to reinvent the bicycle…The most 
obvious examples are from the Nordic countries. Although Denmark, Sweden 
and Finland have all followed their own paths we can to some extent talk of 
the Nordic model…Riigikogu has to make a decision soon. It is necessary to 
rely on the experience of other countries based on these form the solution 
that fits the Estonian realities best, and the most efficient solution for us. 
Several Nordic experts have said good things about the Finnish system, i.e., 
the Grand Committee, because this system is most explicitly defined. This 
does not mean that the automatic copying of this model guarantees the 
success of it in the new context”.35 The writer quotes extensively from the 
report that has been described above from the three Nordic parliaments.   
 
Fame or performance? 
What motivates actors to follow international examples or models from 
elsewhere when they are in a position to make a choice? Rational learning 
models depart from utilitarian motives, whereas sociological accounts 
assume that the selection of a particular policy or institution has symbolic 
purposes.36  In the first case the actors that are searching for solutions scan 
the environment for policies, analyse them in relation to their goals and 
preferences and pick the one that best serves their interest. According to 
models of normative imitation the choice of policies rather follows the logic of 
appropriateness, ”models are adopted because they appear more legitimate, 
successful or appropriate”.37  The purpose might be to gain international 
legitimacy by emulating modernity and compliance with international norms 
and “the adoption of a model not as the result of a goal-oriented choice but 
                                                 
35 Marko Mihkelson, ”Eesti parlamendi roll Euroopa Liidus”, Riigikogu Toimetised 7/2003.  
36 Covadonga 2004, p., Gilardi, 2003, p 
37 Melo, Marcus André, 2004, p. « Institutional Choice and the Diffusion of Policy Paradigms : Brazil and the 
Second Wave of Pension Reform » in International Political Science Review, vol.25, nr.3, p.320-341.  
  25as a result of magnetic attraction”.38 In its strictest form a policy could be 
adopted without taking functional needs into consideration.  
 
Rational learning explanations assume that the actors engage in a wide- 
ranging search for solutions that best fit their needs. Theories of assuming 
full rationality are ideal-typic in that they assume that actors have strong 
analytical capabilities and fixed preferences.  Rather, theories departing from 
conceptions of bounded rationality are more fruitful since it is assumed that 
shortcuts are used when collecting and interpreting information.The 
information gathering activities are not as extensive when bounded 
rationality is the case: All experiences are not scanned in the same way. A 
more selective and restricted process is assumed. Both in the interviews and 
the reports published by the parliamentary committees evidence can be 
found that all experiences are not considered equally interesting. For 
instance in one the reports from the parliamentary investigation of the 
parliamentary organisation of EU Affairs in Lithunia there is a question of 
which of the following member states are worth following: Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, UK, Austria, Ireland, France. The answer given in 
the answers that were provided was the Finnish experience.39  One of the 
civil servants comments that there was “no idea of looking at how 
parliaments work in for instance Greece, Spain and Portugal since we know 
that they are very weak and have little impact”(interview).    
 
Theories of bounded rationality propose two reasons for why policies are 
emulated from certain areas. Firstly, according to the availability heuristics 
policies are transferred from neighbours on which one is dependent. The 
experiences of countries that are closer in geographical, cultural or historical 
terms are paid more attention to. In the interviews conducted in relation to 
the project a Lithuanian parliamentary representative (and the chairman of 
the EAC committee in 2003) stated that “It was important for Lithuania to 
                                                 
38 Weyland, 2005, p.  
39 Darbo grupes del Seimo darbo Lietuvai tapus Europos Sajungos nare koncepcijai ir reikalingiems teises aktu 
paketimu projektams parengti Parlamentino modelio parinkimo darbo pogrupio (nr 2) medziagos savadas 
(Report from the Lithuanian parliament 2003).  
  26have similar parliamentary EU structures as the Northern neighbours in 
order to facilitate regional cooperation within in the EU, but also otherwise” 
(interview). Since gaining independence in 1991 the Nordic and Baltic states 
have had close contacts, even though the political, cultural and historical 
legacies are different.     
 
Secondly, according to the representativeness heuristics logic policies are 
emulated because they are conceived of as the best performing. They are 
chosen on the basis of reputation, not only because they are best suited to 
the domestic needs or demands. That is, there exists a conception of good-
performing models or a ranking list of performance. That is, “a bold 
innovation attracts disproportionate attention from neighbouring countries, 
it is widely adopted on the basis of its apparent promise, not on its 
demonstrated success”. There is ample evidence (that was accounted for 
earlier in the paper) that the Nordic EU oversight scrutiny organisations were 
considered as the best performing in terms of empowering the national 
parliaments in relation to the government (see above).  
 
Normative imitation is an explanation following the logic of appropriateness. 
Some policies are preferred since they are perceived to be more legitimate 
and consequently more appropriate to emulate (Weyland, 2005). This may be 
expressed in the copying of successful models of institutions of which they 
are dependent: External pressures are in operation, but not as conditional 
obligations, but rather as attractive templates with symbolic assets. The 
motive can be strategic since the reason for the choice of a particular policy 
might be to gain international reputation.  The basic idea is that measures 
are adopted not so much of concerns for functional needs, but rather for 
symbolic purposes. The parliamentary processes of designing EU 
parliamentary oversight organisations seems have the character of quite 
knowledge-intensive activities. Moreover, the distribution of power between 
institutions (parliament and government) or parliamentary groups 
(government and opposition) is central in all types of constitutional 
engineering, which is likely to promote probing if different alternatives. 
  27However, it can be quite hard to formulate operationalisations that allow for 
the differentiation between a decision guided by the representativeness 
heuristics alternatively normative imitation. The scope of the information 
gathering activities and the probing of other models in relation to the proper 
political system could be a way of drawing a line between them.        
 
Conclusion 
 
Policy transfer has played a vital role when the ten new member states of 
2004 designed their parliamentary EU scrutiny. The mandating model, 
which provides the parliament with instruments to politically tie the 
government’s hands in the Council negotiations, was the most attractive 
model to emulate Seven out of the ten new member states opted for a 
parliamentary organisation empowering the parliament (through European 
Affairs Committees and/or standing committees) to take ultimately decide 
which standpoint the government shall put forward in the EU policy-making.  
 
External conditionality cannot explain the striking convergence in how the 
new member state adapted their parliamentary organisations to full EU 
membership since the EU has no formal competence whatsoever to dictate 
how national parliaments should participate in the domestic coordination of 
the EU-policymaking. However, soft (non-binding) guidelines and 
recommendations have been produced by the EU and COSAC. These have 
served as starting points for the discussion and comparisons of existing 
parliamentary EU oversight procedures of the older member states. COSAC, 
the European Convention (in particular, the working group of national 
parliaments), other seminars and conferences, as well as bilateral contacts 
between parliaments have constituted arenas where this type of activities of 
probing and formulating good examples and best-performers have been 
identified and formulated. The parliamentary arrangements have been the 
main objects in this beauty contest and some of them actively promoted their 
model by producing reports and advertisements on their model. For 
  28instance, the three Nordic parliaments jointly marketed a so-called Nordic 
model of parliamentary EU-policy-making.  
 
In their decisions the parliaments in the new member states made use of 
short-cuts when deciding which lessons could be learnt from the older 
member-states. That is, bounded rationality seems to best make sense of 
these decision-making processes. More precisely, all models of parliamentary 
oversight were not studied similarly in the investigations preceding the 
decision. Rather the focus of attention was directed towards those that hade 
been identified as the best-performing. In the actual design of the 
parliamentary oversight adjustments or innovations were made to different 
degrees.  It is in the fine-tuning of parliamentary EU models that 
adjustments to the domestic structures become visible.     
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